If an operator can change the Windows clock on an HMI, every timestamp that HMI writes can be argued with.
21 CFR 11.10(e) asks for secure, computer-generated, time-stamped audit trails of operator entries and actions. You can configure that audit trail perfectly and it is still worth little if the time it records comes from a clock anyone can adjust. Set the PC back an hour, repeat a step, set it forward again, and the record looks clean.
PIC/S PI 041-1 expects date and time settings to be controlled and restricted. On the systems we review, that comes down to three checks:
- Only administrators can change date, time and time zone. The right is removed from the operator role in the operating system, not just hidden in the application.
- The clock synchronizes to a reliable source, usually the site NTP server, and a failed sync raises an alarm.
- Any change to the clock is itself logged, with who made it.
The weak spot is rarely the SCADA package. It is the workstation beside the line that was set up years ago with a shared local admin account because that was quicker.
When we write the URS for automation to Part 11 and Annex 11, clock control sits in the security section, and OQ includes a test that tries to change the time from an operator login.
Who holds the right to change the time on your production PCs today?
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