The same anteroom drawing serves an infectious isolation room held negative and a protective isolation room held positive.
Airborne-infection isolation is held negative to the corridor. Air flows in at the door and leaves through the exhaust, often through HEPA filtration, so what the patient breathes out stays in the room. Protective isolation is held positive. HEPA-filtered supply pushes air out towards the corridor, so a patient with little immune defence never meets corridor air.
The anteroom does the same job in both: it stops a door opening from collapsing the pressure difference. Only the direction changes.
Switchable rooms look efficient on paper. The risk sits in the failure mode. A room set positive for a protective patient and left that way when an infectious patient is admitted pushes contaminated air into the corridor. A fan trip in negative mode can leave the room neutral or reversed with nobody noticing.
If a switchable room is built, design its failure like any other safety function. Put a mode indicator and a live pressure display at the door, a local alarm, a switching procedure with a sign-off, and dampers that fail towards the safer position for the current mode.
In our hospital work, pressurisation is engineered as infection control, across operating theatres, isolation rooms and compounding pharmacies.
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