"Root cause: human error. Action: retraining." Three months after the training record is signed, the same deviation is back.
Retraining did what it could. The operator already knew the step. Whatever made the slip easy was still there the next morning: a batch record that asks for two similar entries on facing pages, a balance display nobody can read through the booth glare, a line clearance squeezed into the last ten minutes of a shift.
The 2013 text of EU GMP Chapter 1 is plain about this. Where human error is suspected or identified as the cause, this should be justified, having taken care that process, procedural or system-based errors or problems have not been overlooked. A person can be the last link in the chain. The investigation should still show what else it ruled out.
Two checks move an investigation past the person. One asks whether a second trained operator would have slipped at the same point; the other whether the SOP describes the task the way it is really done on the floor.
The actions that follow change the system. A form is redrawn so two entries cannot be transposed, a label goes on the look-alike valve, the second check moves to where the error can still be caught. Retraining keeps its place where the gap really was knowledge, such as a new starter never shown the step.
One number to pull from the deviation log: how many of last year's records closed as "human error, retrained", and how many of those came back.
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